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Abstract
This paper studies how fiscal policy affects loan market conditions in the US. First,
it conducts a Structural Vector-Autoregression analysis showing that the bank spread
responds negatively to an expansionary government spending shock, while lending in-
creases. Second, it illustrates that these results are mimicked by a Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium model where the bank spread is endogenized via the inclusion of a
banking sector exploiting lending relationships. Third, it shows that lending relation-
ships represent a friction that generates a financial accelerator effect in the transmission
of the fiscal shock.
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1 Introduction
During the Great Moderation the mainstream business cycle literature argued that any pol-
icy instrument other than the monetary policy rate played only a minor role in stabilizing
the economy, this being the main reason why the focus on discretionary fiscal policy as a
countercyclical tool was very limited (see e.g. Blanchard et al., 2010). As the recent crisis
began, it was clear that fiscal policy was at least a dimension along which governments could
do more, having soon realized that the crisis was taking a global and profound dimension, it
was expected to be long-lasting, and the monetary policy interest rate, in many cases, had
almost reached the zero lower bound.
Modern macroeconomics agrees on the fact that credit market conditions significantly
affect business cycle dynamics (see e.g. Bean, 2010; Christiano et al., 2013). In the empirical
literature there is evidence that credit spreads widen during downturns (see Gertler and Lown,
1999; Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero, 2010, 2011; Villa and Yang, 2011, among many others) and the
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) literature offers a variety of explanations
(see Bernanke et al., 1999; Christiano et al., 2013; Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010; Gertler and
Karadi, 2011, among others). As far as the bank spread is concerned, i.e. the difference
between the loan rate and the deposit rate, an appealing but less studied determinant is
offered by lending relationships. Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero (2010) provide empirical evidence
of lending relationships. These imply that banks hold up borrowers because the former gain
an information monopoly over customers’ creditworthiness and the latter find it costly to
switch to a new funding source. This piece of evidence agrees with the analysis of Santos and
Winton (2008), who empirically show that during recessions banks raise the bank spread more
for bank-dependent borrowers than for those with access to public bond markets. According
to Santos and Winton, the increase in the bank spread due to the informational hold up
effect reaches 95 basis points in US data. Petersen and Rajan (1994) estimate that in the US
loan market the average duration of lending relationships is 11 years. The hold-up problem
in the loan market, however, is not a phenomenon involving only the US. The European
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Commission (2007) reports increasing switching costs also in the EU loan market, and there
exists a substantial body of microeconometric evidence of lending relationships in a number
of European countries, such as Italy, Belgium and Norway, where average lending relationship
durations are in the order of 10 years (see Angelini et al., 1998; Degryse and Van Cayseele,
2000; Kim et al., 2003, among others).
Given the empirical relevance of lending relationships and the renewed interest in fiscal
policy, natural questions are then: what are the typical effects of a government spending
expansion on lending and the bank spread? And how is such a fiscal shock transmitted
within an economy featuring lending relationships? Although in the literature there are
papers investigating the stabilization properties of fiscal policy in DSGE models with credit
frictions (see e.g. Fernández-Villaverde, 2010; Canzoneri et al., 2012; Carrillo and Poilly,
2013), these studies do not focus specifically on how a fiscal stimulus affects loan market
conditions and do not take lending relationships into account. This paper fills in this gap on
one hand by estimating the response of lending and the bank spread to a government spending
expansion in a Structural Vector-Autoregressive (SVAR) model of the US economy. On the
other hand, it develops a Real Business Cycle (RBC) model with lending relationships able
(i) to match to a significant extent the empirical findings, and (ii) to provide a theoretical
framework that allows one to study how the fiscal stimulus is transmitted via a banking
sector characterized by the presence of long-lasting lending relationships.
The contribution of the paper is twofold. First, the estimated impulse responses from the
SVAR provide evidence that the bank spread significantly falls in response to a government
spending expansion, while lending increases. Second, the paper shows that, in the RBC
model, a fiscal stimulus becomes more effective if increasingly stronger lending relationships
are present in the loan market. In fact, the government spending expansion, by curbing the
bank spread and boosting lending, fosters better credit market conditions, which in turn
enact second-round expansionary effects on economic activity. In other words, there exists a
financial accelerator effect in the transmission of the fiscal shock.
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Lending relationships have already been explored in the DSGE arena. Aliaga-Diaz and
Olivero (2010) introduce them into an otherwise standard RBC model where countercyclical
bank spreads play a financial accelerator role in the propagation mechanism of technology
shocks. In the New Keynesian (NK) literature, Aksoy et al. (2013) show that lending re-
lationships are a feature of financial intermediation relevant for monetary policy making in
a model with staggered prices and cost channels. The paper follows these studies in incor-
porating lending relationships via the modeling device that firms form deep habits in their
borrowing decisions, following the strategy used by Ravn et al. (2006) to model consumption
decisions. Deep habits in lending represents a very effective, though tractable, tool to incor-
porate the borrower’s hold-up problem without having to explicitly formalize an asymmetric
information problem. In fact, Aksoy et al. (2013, Appendix) formulate an adverse selection
problem for the banking sector based on Akerlof (1970) and show that, in the symmetric
equilibrium, the bank’s profit margin is equivalent to the profit margin under deep habits in
lending.
In this paper, the demand side of the model departs from more standard business cycle
models in that households and the government feature external deep habit formation, and
public goods enter households’ utility with a certain degree of complementarity with private
goods. While the former feature allows to match the sign of a number of impulse responses to
government spending shocks with respect to SVAR results, the latter proves to be a powerful
source of amplification in the transmission of such shocks.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the SVAR es-
timates. Section 3 illustrates the RBC model, describes functional forms and presents the
choice of parameter values. Section 4 discusses the results in the RBC model. Section 5
disentangles the effects of some model features. Section 6 concludes and provides some sug-
gestions for future research. An online appendix complements the paper by providing (a) a
series of robustness checks for the empirical results; (b) an analysis aiming at disentangling
the effects of non-standard modeling features on the results of the DSGE model; (c) a NK
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extension of the model with price stickiness and monetary policy; (d) the full set of the DSGE
model equilibrium conditions as well as the derivation of the deterministic steady state.
2 Empirics
As anticipated, the empirical literature provides evidence of counter-cyclical credit spreads,
but does not cover the more specific issue of how bank spreads and lending react to a gov-
ernment spending shock. This section fills in this gap by estimating a SVAR model of the
US economy employing quarterly US data over the period 1954q1-2007q4. The starting date
avoids the years from 1945 to the Korean war, considered to be turbulent from a fiscal point
of view (see Perotti, 2008, for a discussion), while the end date falls before the start of the
Great Recession.
The baseline specification is an adaptation of Monacelli et al. (2010) whereby the vector
of endogenous variables contains the log of real per-capita government consumption expen-
ditures, the log of real per-capita output, the average marginal tax rate computed by Barro
and Redlick (2011),1 the log of real per-capita private lending and the bank spread. The bank
spread is computed as the difference between the three-month bank prime loan rate (BPLR)
and the quarterly Treasury bill rate. To this five-variable specification further variables of
interest are added one at a time. In particular, the following variables are analyzed: the log of
real per-capita private consumption, the log real per-capita private domestic investment, the
log of per-capita hours of work, the log of the real hourly wage, and the price mark-up.2 Fol-
1This measure of taxes has been employed in recent studies such as Monacelli et al. (2010) and Ramey
(2011). In fact, being less dependent on the business cycle than the more traditional measure based on
net taxes, it better captures policy choices. Nonetheless, the Appendix (Section A.1) shows that, in this
specific case, the choice is completely harmless as the impulse responses are virtually coincident across the
two alternative specifications.
2GDP, the GDP deflator, the interest rates used to compute the bank spread, private consumption, in-
vestment and lending were extracted from the ALFRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Government consumption expenditures were extracted from the NIPA tables of the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. Per-capita hours of work is the series constructed by Francis and Ramey (2009) and available on
Valerie Ramey’s webpage. The real hourly wage is the average hourly wage of production workers in man-
ufacturing produced by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. As in Christiano et al. (2013), private lending
is the sum of total credit market instruments from the liabilities side of the balance sheet of nonfarm nonfi-
nancial corporate business and total credit market instruments from the liabilities side of the balance sheet
5
lowing Monacelli et al. (2010), the specification includes, as exogenous variables, a constant,
a linear trend, and lags zero to four of the Ramey-Shapiro (RS) dummy variables, which take
value one in those quarters in which large military build-ups took place in the US (1965q1,
escalation of the Vietnam war; 1980q1, Carter-Regan military build-up upon the Soviet in-
vasion of Afghanistan; 2001q3, 9/11 attack). The inclusion of the RS episodes addresses at
least partially the issue of anticipation of government expenditure shocks. These in fact are
identified by using the assumption firstly proposed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) – and
extensively adopted since then in the empirical literature – that government spending is un-
able to react to output and other unexpected shocks within a quarter due to implementation
and decision lags typical of the budgeting process. If identification is achieved via a Choleski
decomposition, this assumption simply translates into ordering government spending first
(see e.g. Monacelli et al., 2010). In recent years the empirical literature has debated a great
deal on which identification schemes should be used to analyze the macroeconomic effects of
fiscal policy. Among others, Ramey (2011) criticizes the Blanchard-Perotti (BP) approach
on the grounds that it fails to take into account anticipation effects, and advocate the use
of the narrative approach, which instead uses dummy variables to isolate episodes of discre-
tionary fiscal policy, such as military build-ups. In particular, the point made is that VAR
shocks alone miss the timing of the news as the narrative approach shocks Granger-cause
the VAR shocks. Mertens and Ravn (2012) on one hand show that in theory anticipation
effects may invalidate SVAR estimates of impulse responses; on the other hand they also
show that anticipation effects generally do not overturn the existing findings from the fiscal
SVAR literature, largely employing the BP approach. The online appendix shows that SVAR
results are robust to a series of checks as far as both the specification of the empirical model
– with the addition, for instance, of monetary policy variables – and anticipation effects are
of nonfarm noncorporate business. The price mark-up is computed as the log of the ratio between national
income without capital consumption adjustment in manufacturing and wage and salary disbursements in
manufacturing as in Monacelli and Perotti (2008) and the required variables were extracted from the NIPA
tables. Where appropriate, the series were transformed in real per-capita terms by dividing their nominal
values by the GDP deflator and the civilian population. All series are seasonally adjusted by the source.
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Figure 1: Estimated impulse responses from the SVAR over sample 1954q1–2007q4 to a shock
to government consumption expenditure of size 1% of real output (shaded areas represent
90% confidence intervals).
concerned. In particular, anticipation effects are tackled by using the method proposed by
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) who use forecasts of the Greenbook and the Survey of
Professional Forecasters to purify government spending shocks of any predictable component.
After estimating the reduced form of the SVAR, including four lags of the endogenous vari-
ables, its structural representation and correspondent identification of the structural shocks
is obtained via a Choleski triangularization, as already discussed.3 Figure 1 plots SVAR
impulse responses to a positive shock to government consumption expenditure of size one
percent of real output over a twenty-quarter horizon. All variables react in an hump-shaped
3To achieve this, the variables are ordered as follows: (i) government spending; (ii) output; (iii) the average
marginal tax rate; (iv) private lending; the (v) bank spread. As a robustness check, many alternative variable
orderings were used in the Choleski decomposition, obtaining only negligible differences with respect to the
impulse responses reported as long as government spending was ordered first.
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fashion. Real output increases significantly reaching a peak multiplier of about 1.75 after
two years and a half. Lending shows a statistically significant boost with a peak of almost
5 percent after three years, while the bank spread significantly declines by around 50 basis
points on impact and reaches a negative peak of 70 basis points after two years. Private
consumption is significantly crowded in by government consumption reaching its peak after
two years, while private investment falls on impact and eventually experiences a significant
crowding-in effect peaking after two years and a half. The responses of hours worked and
the real wage are positive (apart from the insignificant negative response of hours worked in
the second quarter), and gain statistical significance after a few quarters (more quickly in
the case of the real wage). Finally, the price mark-up reacts negatively to the fiscal stimulus,
the drop being significant at longer horizons.4
3 Model
This section presents the DSGE model. The economy is populated by: (i) households; (ii) the
government; (iii) entrepreneurs; (iv) final good firms; and (v) banks. Households consume,
save by choosing deposits, and supply labor. The government allocates government purchases
over the varieties of consumption goods and raises lump sum taxes. Private and government
consumption exhibit habits at the level of each variety of goods, i.e deep habits, as in Ravn
et al. (2006). Entrepreneurs borrow from banks to produce a homogeneous wholesale output
sold in a perfectly competitive market. They minimize their borrowing costs by choosing their
demand for loans and exhibit deep habits in lending.5 This feature is present both in the
RBC model by Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero (2010) and in the NK model by Aksoy et al. (2013)
4Recent empirical contributions in the fiscal literature provide support for the fact that a government
spending expansion causes a crowding-in effect on private consumption, an increase in hours worked, a boost
in the real wage and a drop in the price mark-up (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Galí et al., 2007; Caldara
and Kamps, 2008; Monacelli and Perotti, 2008; Pappa, 2009; Monacelli et al., 2010; Canova and Pappa, 2011;
Fragetta and Melina, 2011). The US evidence on the effect of fiscal shocks, however, partially differs from
the evidence in other countries (see Perotti, 2005). For a comprehensive survey see Hebous (2011).
5An important component of firm’s debt in the US is non-banking finance. This paper focuses on bank-
to-firm relationships, hence it abstracts from the issuance of corporate bonds. For a model featuring also
corporate bonds see e.g. De Fiore and Uhlig (2011).
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and represents a reduced form way to incorporate the effects of informational asymmetries
on borrowers’ creditworthiness into a DSGE model. In fact, as explained by Aliaga-Diaz and
Olivero (2010) banks can be thought of accumulating this information by repeatedly lending
to their customers and earning an informational monopoly that creates a borrower’s hold-up
effect. In other words, it becomes costly for borrowers to switch lenders as they should start
the signaling process again. The deep habits framework is not a formal setup of asymmetric
information, but it produces the same effects, as shown by Aksoy et al. (2013, Appendix).
In addition, entrepreneurs maximize the flow of discounted profits by choosing the quantity
of factors for production. Final goods firms buy the wholesale good from entrepreneurs,
differentiate it and sell it in a monopolistically competitive market. Banks maximize the
expected discounted value of lifetime profits by choosing deposits and the loan rate. Their
balance sheet features loans on the assets side and deposits on the liabilities side. The online
appendix provides a NK extension of the model with price stickiness and a central bank.
3.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of households indexed by j ∈ (0, 1). Each house-
hold’s preferences are represented by the following intertemporal utility function:
U j0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
U
(
Xjt , 1−H
j
t
)]
, (1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and Hjt is labor supply in terms of hours worked. Total
time available to households is normalized to unity, thus 1−Hjt represents leisure time.
Following Ravn et al. (2006), preferences feature habit formation at the level of individual
goods, or deep habits (see also Jacob, 2010; Di Pace and Faccini, 2012; Zubairy, 2013a;
Cantore et al., 2013). Similarly to the more common superficial habits, i.e. habits on the
overall level of consumption, also deep habits may be internal or external. However, it is
common practice to use the latter version as this is analytically more tractable. In fact,
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internal deep habits lead to a time inconsistency problem (see Ravn et al., 2006). In other
words, what is commonly assumed is that agents keep up with the Joneses good by good. In
the microeconometric literature there is recent evidence of deep habit formation. For instance
Verhelst and Van den Poel (2012) estimate a spatial panel model using scanner data from a
large European retailer and test for both internal and external deep habit formation. While
they find some categories with internal habit formation, this effect is generally small. On the
contrary, the external habit effect is always positive and significant. In the macroeconometric
literature there are also estimates of deep habits for the US. For instance, Ravn et al. (2006)
use a Generalized Method of Moments estimator applied to the consumption Euler equation
and use the additional restrictions that deep habits imply for the supply side of the economy.
Zubairy (2013b) estimates the deep habit parameters within the broader setting of a Bayesian
estimation of a medium-scale NK model. Cantore et al. (2012a) compare superficial and deep
habit formation within an estimated NK model for the US and provide empirical support in
favour of the deep form of habits.
Let (Xt)
j = X [(Xct )
j, Xgt ] be a composite of habit-adjusted differentiated private and
public consumption goods.6 Let the private component of (Xct )
j be in turn a composite of
differentiated goods indexed by i ∈ (0, 1),
(Xct )
j =
[ˆ 1
0
(Cjit − θS
c
it−1)
1− 1
η di
] 1
1− 1η
, (2)
where η is the elasticity of substitution across varieties, θ is the degree of deep habits in
consumption, Cjit is the real consumption expenditure at time t, and S
c
it−1 denotes the stock
of external habits, which evolves as
Scit = ϱS
c
it−1 + (1− ϱ)Cit, (3)
6This assumption implies that government consumption delivers some utility to private agents (see e.g.
Pappa, 2009; Cantore et al., 2012b). Many studies assume that public consumption goods are not utility-
enhancing, i.e. they are simply a waste of resources. The online appendix shows the effects of this alternative
assumption.
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and ϱ measures the habit persistence.
Household j solves a two-stage optimization problem. First, it minimizes total expendi-
ture,
´ 1
0
PitC
j
itdi, subject to equation (2). The optimal level of consumption for each variety
for a given composite is then given by
Cjit =
(
Pit
Pt
)
−η
(Xct )
j + θScit−1, (4)
where Pt ≡
[´ 1
0
P 1−ηit di
] 1
1−η
is the nominal price index. At the optimum, using equation (4)
and the definition of nominal price index, the nominal value of the habit-adjusted consump-
tion composite can be written as
Pt (X
c
t )
j =
ˆ 1
0
Pit
(
Cjit − θS
c
it−1
)
di. (5)
The second stage of households’ optimization problem consists in the maximization of
utility subject to the budget constraint. Household j’ s actual consumption expenditure at
time t, Cjt , is obtained by rearranging equation (5)
Cjt = (X
c
t )
j + θ
ˆ 1
0
Pit
Pt
Scit−1di.︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Ωjt
(6)
The representative household enters period t with Djt units of real deposits in the bank.
During period t, the household chooses to consume Cjt ; supplies H
j
t hours of work; and
allocates savings in deposits at the bank, Djt+1, that pay the net interest rate R
D
t+1 between
t and t+ 1.
Each period the representative household gains an hourly wage, W jt ; dividend payments,´ 1
0
Πitdi, from final goods firms and
´ 1
0
Πbtdb from banks. In addition, the government im-
poses real lump-sum taxes, Tt. The household’s intertemporal budget constraint can thus be
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expressed as
(Xct )
j + Ωjt +D
j
t+1 ≤ WtH
j
t + (1 +R
D
t )D
j
t +
ˆ 1
0
Πitdi+
ˆ 1
0
Πbtdb− Tt, (7)
where inequality (7) uses equation (6), i.e. that Ωjt = θ
´ 1
0
Pit
Pt
Scit−1di and C
j
t = (X
c
t )
j + Ωjt .
Maximization yields the following first-order conditions with respect to (Xct )
j, Djt+1 and
Hjt :
U jXct = λ
j
t , (8)
Et[Λ
j
t+1(1 +R
D
t+1)] = 1, (9)
−U jHt = λ
j
tWt, (10)
where λjt is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget constraint and Λt,t+1 ≡ βEt
[
λt+1
λt
]
is the stochastic discount factor.7
3.2 Government
Following Ravn et al. (2006) deep habits are present also in government consumption. This
can be justified by assuming that households form habits also on consumption of government-
provided goods. Alternatively, as in Leith et al. (2012) and Ravn et al. (2012), one can also
argue that public goods are local in nature and households care about the provision of
individual public goods in their constituency relative to other constituencies. For example,
controversies over “post-code lotteries” in health care and other local services (Cummins et al.,
2007) and comparisons of regional per capita government spending levels (MacKay, 2001)
suggest that households care about their local government spending levels relative to those
in other constituencies. Ravn et al. (2012) also propose the idea of procurement relationships
that create a tendency for the government to favour transactions with sellers that supplied
public goods in the past.
7Functional forms for equilibrium conditions (8)–(10) are reported in the online appendix.
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In each period t, the government allocates spending, PtGt, over differentiated goods sold
by retailers in a monopolistic market to maximize the quantity of a habit-adjusted composite
good
Xgt =
[ˆ 1
0
(Git − θS
g
it−1)
1− 1
η di
] 1
1− 1η
, (11)
subject to the budget constraint
´ 1
0
PitGit ≤ PtGt, where S
g
it−1 denotes the stock of habits
for government expenditures, which evolves as
Sgit = ϱS
g
it−1 + (1− ϱ)Git. (12)
At the optimum,
Git =
(
Pit
Pt
)
−η
Xgt + θS
g
it−1. (13)
Aggregate real government consumption Gt evolves as an autoregressive process:
log
(
Gt
G¯
)
= ρG log
(
Gt−1
G¯
)
+ ϵgt , (14)
where G¯ is the steady-state level of government spending, ρG is an autoregressive parameter,
and ϵgt is a mean zero, i.i.d. random shock with standard deviation σ
G. The government runs
a balanced budget, i.e. government spending is simply set equal to lump-sum taxes.
3.3 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs are distributed over a unit interval and indexed by e ∈ (0, 1). They borrow
from banks to produce a homogeneous wholesale output that they sell in a perfectly com-
petitive market. Entrepreneurs solve two optimization problems: an intratemporal problem,
giving rise to lending relationships, in which they decide the composition of their loan de-
mand; and an intertemporal problem in which they maximize the flow of discounted profits
by choosing the quantity of factors for production.
The intratemporal problem can be thought of being solved by the financial department
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of each firm e, which decides how much to borrow from each bank b given its overall loan
demand. Lending relationships arise due to the presence of deep habits in lending. From
a technical point of view, the problem is analogous to the intratemporal problem solved
by households when they feature deep habits in consumption. The optimization problem
consists in the following:
min
Le
bt
ˆ 1
0
(1 +RLbt)L
e
btdb, (15)
s.t.
[ˆ 1
0
(Lebt − θ
LSLbt−1)
1− 1
ηL db
]1/(1− 1
ηL
)
=
(
XLt
)e
, (16)
SLbt = ϱ
LSLbt−1 + (1− ϱ
L)Lbt, (17)
where RLbt is the net lending rate, L
e
bt is the demand by firm e for loans issued by bank
b, θL is the degree of habit in lending, SLbt is the stock of (external) habit in lending, η
L
is the elasticity of substitution across varieties of loans,
(
XLt
)e
is the demand for loans by
firm e augmented by lending relationships and ϱL is the persistence of lending relationships.
Equation (15) represents overall lending expenditure, equation (16) imposes deep habits in
lending, and (17) imposes persistence in the stock of habit.
The solution to the above problem yields firm e’s demand for loans from bank b,
Lebt =
(
1 +RLbt
1 +RLt
)−ηL (
XLt
)e
+ θLSLbt−1, (18)
where (1 + RLt ) is the price index for the loan composite and corresponds to the Lagrange
multiplier attached to constraint (16) as standard with the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator.
Entrepreneur e faces also an intertemporal problem by solving which she chooses em-
ployment Het , capital K
e
t+1 and investment I
e
t to maximize the expected discounted value
of its lifetime profits. Recalling that in this economy firms are owned by households, the
stochastic discount factor of the former, Λt,t+1, is given by the intertemporal marginal rate
of substitution of the latter. The intertemporal optimization problem is summarized by the
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following:
max
Het ,K
e
t+1,I
e
t
Et
∞∑
s=0
Λt,t+s


Φt+sF (K
e
t+s, H
e
t+s)−Wt+sH
e
t+s − I
e
t+s
+
(
XLt+s
)e
−
´ 1
0
(1 +RLbt+s−1)L
e
bt+s−1db+ Ξ
e
t+s

 , (19)
s.t. Ket+1 = I
e
t
[
1− S
(
Iet
Iet−1
)]
+ (1− δ)Ket , (20)
ˆ 1
0
Lebtdb ≥ I
e
t +WtH
e
t . (21)
Equation (19) is the sum of discounted profits expressed in terms of net cash flows. F (Ket , h
e
t)
is an increasing and concave production function in capital and labor, Φt is the competitive
real price at which the wholesale output is sold, WtH
e
t is the wage bill, I
e
t is the expenditure
in investment goods, Ξet ≡ θ
L
´ 1
0
1+RL
bt
1+RLt
SLbt−1db such that
(
XLt
)e
+ Ξet =
´ 1
0
Lebtdb = L
e
t , i.e.
the amount of loans that flow into the entrepreneur’s balance sheet, while
´ 1
0
(1 + RLbt)L
e
btdb
represents what they repay to banks. Equation (20) is a standard law of motion of capital,
which depreciates at rate δ, and investment is subject to adjustment costs as in Smets and
Wouters (2007), where S (1) = S ′(1) = 0 and S ′′ (1) > 0. Constraint (21) makes it necessary
for firms to borrow from banks in order to finance investment expenditure and the wage bill,
i.e. it represents a financing constraint needed for external credit to play a role in the model.
Without the imposition of this constraint, firms would always find it optimal to satisfy their
financing needs via internal funds. Thus (21) holds with equality in equilibrium. Investment
Iet is also a composite of differentiated goods but it is not subject to deep habit formation:
Iet =
[´ 1
0
(Ieit)
1− 1
η di
] 1
1− 1η . Expenditure minimisation leads to the optimal level of demand of
investment goods for each variety i,
Ieit =
(
Pit
Pt
)
−η
Iet . (22)
Substituting for equations (20) and (21) into (19) and taking the first-order conditions with
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respect to Het , K
e
t+1 and I
e
t lead to the following:
ΦtFH,t = WtEt
[
Λt,t+1(1 +R
L
t )
]
, (23)
Qt = EtΛt,t+1
[
Φt+1FK,t+1 +Qt+1(1− δ)
]
, (24)
Et
[
Λt,t+1(1 +R
L
t )
]
= Qt
[
1− S
(
It
It−1
)
− S ′
(
It
It−1
)
It
It−1
]
+ EtΛt,t+1
[
Qt+1S
′
(
It+1
It
)(
It+1
It
)2 ]
. (25)
Condition (23) equates the real value of the marginal product of labor to the cost of the
marginal hour of work, which in turn depends on the real wage and the lending rate. Con-
dition (24) equates the cost of one unit of capital, Qt, to its expected benefit at the margin.
The latter, in turn, incorporates (i) the expected real value of the marginal product of capital,
and (ii) the expected marginal saving deriving from not having to borrow fraction (1− δ) of
capital one period ahead. The real price Φt represents the shadow value of output. Lastly,
equation (25) equates the marginal borrowing cost for investment purposes to the marginal
benefit, which is net of investment adjustment costs.
3.4 Final good firms
A continuum of final good firms i ∈ (0, 1) buy the wholesale good from entrepreneurs at the
real price Φt, differentiate it and sell it in a monopolistically competitive market at price Pit.
The real price Φt charged by entrepreneurs in the wholesale competitive market represents
also the real marginal cost common to all final good firms, i.e. MCt = Φt. Final good firm
i chooses Cit+s, S
c
it+s, Git+s, S
g
it+s and pit+s ≡ Pit+s/Pt+s to maximize the following flow of
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discounted profits
Et
∞∑
s=0
Λt,t+s
{(
Pit+s
Pt+s
−MCt+s
)
(Cit+s + Iit+s +Git+s)
}
, (26)
subject to the demand for good i in the form of private consumption Cit, (4), investment
Iit, (22), and government consumption Git, (13), and the laws of motion of the stocks of
habits for households, (3), and the government, (12). This leads to the following first-order
conditions:
Pit
Pt
−MCt + (1− ϱ)λ
c
t = ν
c
t , (27)
EtΛt,t+1(θν
c
t+1 + ϱλ
c
t+1) = λ
c
t , (28)
Pit
Pt
−MCt + (1− ϱ)λ
g
t = ν
g
t , (29)
EtΛt,t+1(θν
g
t+1 + ϱλ
g
t+1) = λ
g
t , (30)
Pit
Pt
(Cit +Git) + (1− η)
(
Pit
Pt
)1−η
It
+ηMCt
(
Pit
Pt
)
−η
It − ην
c
t
(
Pit
Pt
)
−η
Xct − ην
g
t
(
Pit
Pt
)
−η
Xgt = 0, (31)
where νct , ν
g
t , λ
c
t and λ
g
t are the Lagrange multipliers on constraints (6), (13), (3) and (12),
respectively.
Let MCnt denote the nominal marginal cost. The gross mark-up charged by final good
firm i can be defined as µit ≡ Pit/MC
n
t =
Pit
Pt
/
MCnt
Pt
= pit/MCt. In the symmetric equilibrium
all final good firms charge the same price, Pit = Pt, hence the relative price is unity, pit = 1. It
follows that, in the symmetric equilibrium, the mark-up is simply the inverse of the marginal
cost.
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3.5 Banking sector
Each bank b chooses its demand for deposits, Dbt+1, and the loan rate, R
L
bt+1, to maximize
the expected discounted value of its lifetime profits. Banks are owned by households as well;
therefore, their stochastic discount factor, Λt,t+1, is given by the intertemporal marginal rate
of substitution of the households. The optimization problem is summarized by the following:
max
Dbt,R
L
bt
Et
∞∑
s=0
Λt,t+s
{
Dbt+s+1 − Lbt+s+1 + (1 +R
L
bt+s)Lbt+s − (1 +R
D
t+s)Dbt+s
}
, (32)
s.t. Lbt = Dbt, (33)
Lbt =
(
1 +RLbt
1 +RLt
)−ηL
XLt + θ
LSLbt−1. (34)
Equation (32) represents the cash flow of the bank in each period, given by the difference
between deposits and loans and the difference by earnings on assets, priced at the net rate
RLbt, and interest payments on liabilities. Equation (33) represents the bank’s balance sheet,
where loans on the asset side are equal to deposits on the liabilities side. Equation (34)
represents the bank-specific demand for loans.
Taking the first-order conditions with respect to Lbt+1 and R
L
bt+1 yields:
νbt = EtΛt,t+s
[(
RLbt+1 −R
D
t+1
)
+ νbt+1θ
L(1− ϱL)
]
, (35)
Et [Λt,t+sLbt+1] = νbtη
LEt
[
XLt+1
]
, (36)
respectively, where νbt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with this maximization problem.
Equation (35) states that the shadow value of lending an extra unit in period t is equal to
the benefit from the spread earned on this transaction plus the benefit of expected future
profits arising from a share θL of lending being held-up at time t+ 1. According to equation
(36), the marginal benefit of increasing the loan rate should be equal to its marginal cost
given by the reduced demand for loans evaluated at νbt.
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3.6 Equilibrium
In the symmetric equilibrium, goods markets, the labor market, and the loan market clear.
The symmetric equilibrium consists of an allocation and a sequence of prices and co-state
variables that satisfy the optimality conditions of households, the government, entrepreneurs,
final goods firms and banks; and the stochastic processes.
The resource constraint completes the model:
Yt = Ct + It +Gt. (37)
Taking a log-linear approximation of the equilibrium system around steady-state values,
and using the Blanchard-Kahn procedure, yields the following state-space solution:
sˆt+1 = Φ1sˆt +Φ2ϵt+1, (38)
dˆt = Φ3sˆt, (39)
where vector sˆt includes predetermined and exogenous variables; vector dˆt contains the con-
trol variables; vector ϵt includes all random disturbances; and matricesΦ1, Φ2 andΦ3 contain
elements that depend on the structural parameters of the model. The online appendix pro-
vides the full set of equilibrium conditions at the symmetric equilibrium and the computation
of the deterministic steady state.
3.7 Functional forms
To simulate the model the utility function specializes as U(Xt, 1 − Ht) =
[Xωt (1−Ht)1−ω]
1−σ
1−σ
,
where σ > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and ω is a preference parameter
that determine the relative weight of leisure and the consumption composite in utility.
The consumption composite is a CES aggregate of private and public deep-habit-adjusted
consumption, Xt =
{
ν
1
σx
x (Xct )
σx−1
σx + (1− νx)
1
σx (Xgt )
σx−1
σx
} σx
σx−1 , with νx representing the
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share of the private component in the aggregator and σx being the elasticity of substi-
tution between the private and the public component. Investment adjustment costs are
quadratic: S
(
It
It−1
)
= γ
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
, γ > 0, while the production function is Cobb-Douglas:
F (Ht, Kt) = H
α
t K
1−α
t , where α represents the labor share of income.
3.8 Parameter choice
A number of parameter values are chosen to match some stylized facts for the US economy in
the post-WWII era while others are set in accordance with available US empirical estimates.
The time period in the model corresponds to one quarter in the data. Table 1 summarizes
the parameter choice.
As standard in the business cycle literature, the subjective discount factor, β, is equal to
0.99 and the capital depreciation rate, δ, to 0.025. The parameters in the utility functions are
as follows: the coefficient of relative risk aversion, σ, is equal to 1.38 as in Smets and Wouters
(2007); and the preference parameter, ω, is set to match steady-state hours of work equal to
0.44, as in Kydland and Prescott (1991); the elasticity of substitution between the private
and the public component of the deep-habit-adjusted consumption composite, σx, is equal
to 0.5, a value in the range proposed by Pappa (2009) that implies mild complementarity;
while the share of the private component in the composite, νx, is set to match a government
share of output of 20%. While Section 5 shows sensitivity of the results to different degrees
of complementarity between private and public consumption, the online appendix shows
also the case in which public consumption does not deliver any utility to households. The
production function parameter, α, is equal to 0.6, as in Christiano et al. (2013).
The consumption deep habits parameters, θ and ϱ, are equal to 0.86 and 0.85, respectively,
following the estimates used by Ravn et al. (2006). The parameters representing deep habits
in lending relationships, θL and ϱL are set equal to 0.72, and 0.85, respectively, relying on
the estimates provided by Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero (2010). As the presence of deep habits in
consumption and in borrowing decisions are key in enabling the DSGE model to reproduce
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Parameter Value
Discount factor β 0.99
Capital depreciation rate δ 0.025
Risk aversion σ 1.38
Elast. of subst. in consumption composite σx 0.5
Production function parameter α 0.6
Deep habits in consumption θ 0.86
Consumption habit persistence ϱ 0.85
Deep habits in lending θL 0.72
Pers. of lending relationships ϱL 0.85
Persistence of government spending ρG 0.97
Elasticity of investment adjustment costs γ 5.74
Share of private component in consumption composite νx set to target
G
Y
= 0.20
Preference parameter ω set to target H = 0.44
Elasticity of substitution η set to target µ = 1.20
Elast. of subst. in banking ηL set to target RL −RD = 0.0075
Table 1: Parameter choice
empirical patterns, the online appendix shows sensitivity analysis of the results to a wide
range of values for the parameters θ, ϱ, θL and ϱL.
The persistence parameter of government spending shocks ρG, set to 0.97, and the param-
eter in the adjustment cost function γ, equal to 5.74, follow the estimated values of Smets
and Wouters (2007).
Following Christensen and Dib (2008), the elasticity of substitution across different va-
rieties, η, is set in order to target a steady state gross mark-up equal to 1.20, while the
elasticity of substitution in the banking sector, ηL, is set in order to match a bank spread of
0.0075 (300 basis points per year).8 In addition to the explicitly-targeted steady-state values,
the above parameter choice implies a consumption-output ratio of around 60% and a private
investment-output ratio of around 20%.
8The price mark-up and the bank spread are not only functions of the intra-temporal elasticity of sub-
stitutions in the goods sector and in the banking sector, but they are also a function of the degrees of deep
habit formation in consumption, θ, and borrowing decisions, θL. Given the baseline choices of θ and θL, the
targeted levels of steady-state price mark-up and bank spread are reached by choosing η ≈ 8 and ηL ≈ 425,
respectively.
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4 Results
This section first analyzes the effects of an expansionary government spending shock in the
model presented in Section 3. It then disentangles the role of financial frictions in the
transmission mechanism of the fiscal shock.
Figure 2 shows that when the economy is hit by an expansionary government spending
shock, a negative wealth effect, caused by the absorption of resources by the government,
makes consumption and leisure less affordable and stimulates labor supply (see e.g. Baxter
and King, 1993; Cogan et al., 2010). At the same time, however, the presence of deep habits
in private and government consumption causes a fall in the price mark-up. Under deep habits
the mark-up is counter-cyclical due to the coexistence of two effects: an intra-temporal effect
(or price-elasticity effect) and an inter-temporal effect. The intra-temporal effect can easily
be understood by looking at the demand faced by an individual firm i:
ADit = Cit +Git + Iit =
(
Pit
Pt
)
−η
(Xct +X
g
t + It) + θ
(
Scit−1 + S
g
it−1
)
. (40)
The right-hand side of the demand curve is given by the sum of a price-elastic term and a
price-inelastic term. When the habit-adjusted aggregate demand (Xct +X
g
t + It) rises, the
“weight” of the price-elastic component of demand grows and the effective price elasticity
of demand, η˜it ≡ −
∂ADit
∂pit
pit
ADit
= η
(
1− θ
(Scit−1+S
g
it−1)
ADit
)
, increases, as opposed to remaining
constant and equal to η as in the standard case (θ = 0). The fact that the elasticity of
demand is pro-cyclical is one determinant for the price mark-up being counter-cyclical. The
other determinant comes from the inter-temporal effect: the awareness of higher future sales
coupled with the notion that consumers form habit at the variety level, makes firms inclined
to give up some of the current profits – by temporarily lowering their mark-up – in order to
lock-in new consumers into customer/firm relationships and charge them higher mark-ups in
the future.
The fall in the mark-up translates into a rise in labor demand stronger than the rise in
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to a shock to government consumption expenditures of size 1%
of real output.
labor supply and into an increase in the demand for investment. The presence of investment
adjustment costs makes it optimal to postpone the investment peak for few quarters. The
resulting increase in the real wage triggers a strong substitution effect away from leisure and
into consumption, hence the crowding-in of the latter. Both the increase in the real wage and
the consumption crowding-in are consistent with the empirical evidence reported in Section 2.
As the government spending shock is normalized to 1% of output, the response of output itself
can be read as a fiscal multiplier, at impact equal to around 1.8, a value close to the empirical
peak response reported in Figure 1. Given the presence of the financing constraint, the rise in
the demands for labor and investment translates into an outward shift of the demand for loans
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made by firms, which is mirrored into a rise in the demand for deposits made by banks. The
supply of deposits also experiences an outward shift, given the increased economic activity
and the intertertemporal consumption/saving choice of forward-looking agents. The relative
size of the shift of demand and supply in the markets for deposits and loans determines
the sign of the responses of the deposit and the loan rates. In particular, the presence of
investment adjustment costs – the effects of which are disentangled in Section 5 – makes the
supply effect prevail and both rates fall. The change in the bank spread is determined by
how the two rates change with respect to each other. At this point lending relationships
come into play. In fact, in the market for loans, banks incorporate the information of high
future returns and hence their prospective ability of making high future profits due to the
output expansion. Therefore, they are willing to give up some of the current profits in order
to expand their customer base by locking in new customers into lending relationships. As
a result, the loan rate falls in a more-than-proportional fashion compared to the fall in the
deposit rate. Hence, the bank spread decreases and equilibrium lending rises.9 In particular,
the model predicts a fall in the bank spread of around 35 basis points – less than the peak
observed in the data – and a surge in lending of around 4%, which instead is in line with
VAR estimates. The model does not reproduce the pronounced hump shape of the VAR
impulse responses, but overall depicts similar effects, at least as far as the sign, and, to a
certain extent, the amplitude of the impulse responses to a government spending shock are
concerned.
4.1 Financial accelerator effect
Figure 3 disentangles the financial accelerator effect in the transmission of the government
spending expansion. In particular, it shows the impact responses of the endogenous variables
to different degrees of deep habits in lending, θL. If θL = 0 the model is not able to capture
9Although with a different transmission mechanism, Carrillo and Poilly (2013) obtain the same sign of
the impulse responses of lending and the corporate bond spread to a government spending expansion in a
NK model featuring financial frictions as in Bernanke et al. (1999).
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Figure 3: The financial accelerator effect (impact responses to a government spending ex-
pansion of 1% of output).
the borrower’s hold up effect and the bank spread becomes constant by construction. In
other words, financial frictions modeled in the form of lending relationships are removed.
When θL > 0 the model exhibits a financial accelerator effect. The higher the degree of
deep habits in lending the more, in response to a fiscal stimulus, banks are willing to supply
loans, exerting an increasingly downward pressure on the loan rate. This further stimulates
lending and results into an increasingly stronger fall in the endogenous bank spread. For
instance, an increase in θL from the baseline value of 0.72 to 0.82 brings the impact fall of
the bank spread from 35 basis points to almost 70. As firms have more funds to finance
their capital acquisition and the wage bill, investment and hours worked increase by more,
which in turn allows for a greater expansion in output. These results suggest that, in the
presence of lending relationships, fiscal policy becomes more effective because it leads to an
improvement of loan market conditions and hence to a further boost in economic activity.
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5 Effects of some model features
This section disentangles the contribution of some key model features in determining the
results presented in Section 4.
First, Figure 4a shows how the baseline model responds to a government expenditure
shock vis-à-vis a restricted model in which deep habit formation in private and government
consumption has been switched off. The latter model is straightforwardly obtained by setting
θ = 0. Without deep habits the price mark-up remains constant as in standard RBC models
with imperfect competition. As a result, the transmission mechanism of a government spend-
ing expansion is dominated by the negative wealth effect that fosters a drop in consumption,
investment and the real wage. Real output consequently rises in a less-than-proportional
fashion with respect to government expenditures. These effects do not mirror the empirical
impulse responses reported in Section 2. In addition, in the absence of deep habits, because
of the prevailing negative wealth effect, the shift in the supply of deposits and, as a conse-
quence, of loans is weaker. At the same time, the demand for loans (which translates into the
demand for deposits) increases as firms have to borrow in order to pay the increased wage
bill and the fall in investment is gradual, given the presence of investment adjustment costs.
Such dynamics foster an increase in the deposit and in the lending rate. The bank spread
still falls as the presence of lending relationships makes it optimal for banks to raise the loan
rate less than proportionally to the rise in the deposit rate. While the responses of lending
and the bank spread are in line with empirics as far as their sign is concerned, they feature
a much smaller amplification that, on the contrary, is at odds with the data.
Next, Figure 4b depicts a similar exercise consisting in removing investment adjustment
costs, i.e. in setting γ = 0. As it is well known in the DSGE literature, such costs make it
optimal for firms to change investment gradually. As a result, investment becomes hump-
shaped and for most variables only the amplification is affected. Interestingly, in the absence
of investment adjustment costs the loan rate and the deposit rate increase instead of falling.
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(a) Deep habits in private and government consumption
0 10 20
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Real output (% of SS)
0 10 20
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Consumption (% of SS)
0 10 20
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
Investment (% of SS)
0 10 20
0
1
2
3
4
5
Hours worked (% of SS)
0 10 20
−1
0
1
2
3
Real wage (% of SS)
0 10 20
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Lending (% of SS)
0 10 20
−1.2
−1
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
Loan rate (% of SS)
0 10 20
−1.2
−1
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
Deposit rate (% of SS)
0 10 20
−50
−40
−30
−20
−10
0
10
20
Spread (bpts)
0 10 20
−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
Price mark−up (% of SS)
 
 
Baseline No investment adjustment costs (γ = 0)
(b) Investment adjustment costs
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Figure 4: Effects of some model features (impulse responses to a government spending ex-
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This is determined by fact that the outward shift of the loan demand, following a government
spending expansion, dominates the outward shift of the loan supply.On the contrary, when
investment adjustment costs are in place, the supply-side effect prevails on the demand-side
because firms are better off delaying the change in investment. In either case, however, the
lending relationship mechanism ensures that the relative movements of the two interest rates
are such that the bank spread falls in line with the evidence provided in Section 2.
Finally, Figure 4c highlights the implications of complementarity between public and
private consumption in households’ utility function. As it is well known in microeconomic
theory, when σx → 0 the aggregator function of the two components of consumption tends to
Leontief, and private and public consumption become perfect complements. Instead, when
σx → 1 the aggregator function tends to Cobb-Douglas and the two goods are imperfect
substitutes. It follows that the smaller is σx the more private consumption is crowded in by
a fiscal stimulus as public goods have to be consumed together with private goods. Such a
mechanism affects the magnitude of changes in all macroeconomic variables, while preserving
their signs, and turns out to be a powerful amplification mechanism.
The online appendix discusses the sensitivity of the results to several model features in
greater detail. In particular, a sufficiently large degree of deep habits in consumption is needed
to match empirics as far as the sign of impulse responses to a government spending shock is
concerned. As also shown in Subsection 4.1, results are qualitatively robust to any positive
degree of lending relationships, which mainly affect the magnitude of financial variables. The
choice of the persistence of deep habits in consumption and in lending affects the magnitude
and timing of impulse responses, while their sign remain unaffected. A utility-enhancing
government spending (as opposed to a “useless” government consumption) proves to be an
important amplifier of the crowding-in effect on private consumption. The assumption of
flexible prices proves harmless as main results hold in a NK extension of the model.
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6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the effects of a government spending expansion on loan market conditions
and the implications of lending relationships for the effectiveness of a fiscal stimulus. A
SVAR analysis conducted on US post-WWII data suggests that the bank spread responds
negatively to a fiscal expansion, while lending increases. A RBC model where the bank
spread is endogenized via the inclusion of a banking sector exploiting lending relationships
mimics such findings. The model exhibits a financial accelerator effect in the fiscal policy
transmission, as lending relationships determine an amplification mechanism of fiscal shocks.
From a policy perspective such a feature is relevant in normal times but becomes even more
relevant in a period of tight credit market conditions characterized by a shortage of lending
and high borrowing costs. In fact, a fiscal stimulus makes lending more available to firms
and this acts as a reinforcing mechanism in the expansion in real economic activity.
These results open interesting avenues for future research. For example, it would be useful
to perform a Bayesian estimation of the DSGE model that allows, on one hand, to carry out a
likelihood-race validation of key model features and, on the other hand, to provide a DSGE-
based estimate of the lending relationships parameters that, in the literature, have so far
been estimated using single equation methods. Moreover, the analysis could be extended to
other advanced economies, such as the euro area, Japan, and the UK, in order to disentangle
potential country-specific effects.
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